


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Office of Current Intelligence

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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


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1. FAURE THINKS HIS OVERTHROW IS LIKELY

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French premier Faure told Ambassador Dillon on 24 November that he would probably be overthrown before he could get the National Assembly to set a definite date for elections.

The embassy points out that the government's position has weakened seriously since the failure of the premier's effort to have elections held in December. Faure's call for a vote of confidence on dissolution of the assembly in February is an effort to counter attempts by his opponents to avoid the election issue by overthrowing him on general policy.

Comment

Heretofore, one of Faure's strongest crutches was the deputies' conviction that it would be difficult to reach agreement on a successor. His opponents have been encouraged to seek his downfall now by his acceptance of Communist support on the early election issue and by the growing support for an electoral system of single-deputy districts to replace the current department-wide balloting.

A new premier, possibly Mendes-France, might be invested on the promise of elections as soon as electoral reform is accomplished. Since redistricting, which would be necessary for single-deputy constituencies, would alter the representation of over 50 percent of the departments, the Mendes-France forces could expect the assembly to wrangle long enough over the proposed changes to give Mendes-France the campaigning time he wants.

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
2. VENEZUELA REPORTED TRAINING COSTA RICANS PLANNING REVOLUTION

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Foreign Minister Esquivel told American ambassador Woodward in San José on 23 November that "about 500" Costa Ricans are being trained in Venezuela by the Caracas government for an attack on Costa Rica. Costa Rican defense officials speculate that plans may call for an

invasion and a simultaneous internal uprising.



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Comment

The Venezuelan regime, which assisted Nicaragua in promoting the invasion of Costa Rica last January by Costa Rican exiles, hates and distrusts the Figueres administration for its past aggressive championship of democracy and its tolerant attitude toward the activities of Venezuelan exiles. A number of participants in the January invasion went to Venezuela from Nicaragua last March at Venezuelan expense.




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3. PEIPING SHOWS IMPATIENCE WITH JOHNSON-WANG TALKS IN GENEVA

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Peiping's impatience with the lack of progress in the ambassadorial talks at Geneva has been evident in several recent statements accusing the United States of "stalling" and asserting that the talks cannot be "prolonged indefinitely."

Deputy Premier Chen I, speaking to a visiting East German group, has made the most bellicose of these statements, saying Taiwan will be invaded if the talks break down.

Chen, the long-time commander of all military forces in East China, called attention to the "rapid" construction of Fukien Province's first rail line, the building of "numerous" ships, and the construction of "numerous" air bases along the coast.

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While apparently not yet capable of a successful Taiwan invasion, the Communists can at any time step up their military pressure on the offshore islands. Such a move would lend substance to Communist threats and would probably be aimed at strengthening Peiping's bargaining position at Geneva.

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4. TURKEY AND IRAQ TO PRESS FOR JORDAN'S
ADHERENCE TO BAGHDAD PACT

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[redacted] Iraqi prime minister Nuri and Turkish prime minister Menderes are notifying Jordan they "will extend some arms and economic aid" if Amman decides to join the Baghdad pact, according to the American embassy in Baghdad.

British foreign secretary Macmillan has also said Britain is ready to grant "some arms aid" and to revise the Anglo-Jordanian treaty if Jordan joins. Both Nuri and Menderes are confident these assurances, in addition to the promise of "some arms aid" from the British, will bring Jordan into the pact.

Comment Iraq, the only Arab state in the Baghdad pact, is anxious to prevent being isolated from the Arab world and to prevent Egypt from achieving undisputed leadership of the Arab states.

King Hussain of Jordan is believed to favor membership in the pact, but [redacted]

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[redacted] public opinion is strongly opposed. It is not likely that Turkey and Iraq can offer sufficient inducement from their own resources to persuade Jordan to join.

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6. BURMESE COMMUNIST LEADER MAY BE NEGOTIATING
FOR AMNESTY

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[REDACTED] Rumors persist that Than Tun, leader of the insurgent Burma Communist Party, is in Rangoon seeking an amnesty with a view to open association of his followers with the Communist-front Burma Workers and Peasants Party, according to the American army attaché. The American embassy also has heard that the government has been in communication with the Communist leader. A Burmese cabinet officer admitted to the embassy that government leaders are receiving letters from Communists suggesting a deal.

Comment

An effort by Than Tun to negotiate would be compatible with the current trend among Asian Communist parties to pursue their objectives by "peaceful methods."

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[REDACTED] Influential members of the Burmese government, including the defense minister, are reportedly in favor of offering more lenient amnesty terms than those presently extended to the Communists.

The cessation of insurgent activity by the Burma Communist Party would remove the most immediate obstacle to the development of even friendlier relations between Burma and the Sino-Soviet bloc. [REDACTED]

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 25 November)

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[REDACTED] minor incidents continue to be reported on the Egyptian-Israeli border. A small selective call-up of Israeli forces and heavy vehicles was reported under way on 24 November. It was then suggested that Israel might be in the initial stages of a large call-up. On 25 November the American army attaché in Tel Aviv reported that it has apparently been completed. The attaché believes that the call-up is for training purposes or in support of a possible reprisal raid. [REDACTED]

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King Saud of Saudi Arabia informed Ambassador Wadsworth on 22 November that the Saudi ambassador in New Delhi had been approached by the Polish government and offered arms, including aircraft, guns, and "anything else, all of best quality." Saud informed the American ambassador that his government would not decide on this offer, or on a Russian offer which is under consideration, until it learns the results of its discussions with the United States. The royal counselor who conveyed the king's message assured Wadsworth that "despite anything you may read or hear--the king will not change what he had told you before hearing from you again." This assurance is in line with other recent Saudi statements. [REDACTED]

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